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Financialisation of Capitalist Economies –  
Bargaining on Conventional Economic Rationalities 
Jürgen Kädtler ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Finanzialisierung kapitalistischer Ökonomien – Aushandlun-
gen der konventionenbasierten ökonomischen Rationalitäten«. The paper deals 
with financialisation of capitalist economies since the 1990s drawing on a con-
ventional concept of economic rationalities. It is argued that financial rational-
ity is not the mere outcome of relations of power rooted elsewhere but a power 
resource on its own. It is analysed as one type of bounded rationality among 
others, the recent predominance of which traces back mainly to a paradigmatic 
shift in economics. However predominance does not mean unambiguousness. 
It is demonstrated that financial rationality on the level of companies or com-
panies’ strategies always has to be interpreted and specified in the perspective 
of other rationalities. And effective financialised strategies are always the out-
come of bargaining between social actors bringing into play various interests, 
power resources, and rationalities. The financial and economic crisis since 
2007 is perceived as symptomatic for a new kind of systemic instabilities 
caused by the predominance of financial rationality. 
Keywords: conventions, bounded rationality, financialisation, shareholder 
value. 
Introduction 
Putting the hype of financial markets since the 1990s and the following crash in 
historical perspective, they may be perceived as just one more in the long series 
of “Manias, Panics, and Crashes” (Kindleberger 2005) going along with capi-
talist economies from their very beginning in the early 17th century (Kindle-
berger 2005, 294-303). The intriguing questions remains however, how there 
could be still so much continuity despite the lessons learned from the previous 
global financial crisis in 1928 and the following Great Depression, when it had 
become common knowledge that capitalist economies must be protected 
against financial markets’ notorious instability and irrationality by strict regula-
tion? And why is there still so much continuity? Whereas the crisis since 1928 
resulted in a paradigmatic shift in general economic thinking and policies, there 
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is nothing like that with the actual crisis. We will discuss these questions of 
continuity and discontinuity referring to a concept of financialisation1. 
Financialisation of capitalist economies means a rearrangement of (the pri-
ority of) reasons that can be used efficiently in order to justify economic action. 
Where product qualities, market conditions, or technical aspects used to define 
the opportunities and the limits of reasonable profits, now financial parameters 
or financial markets’ requirements are given priority, at least in principle. At 
the same time financialisation means a rearrangement of relations of power 
between social actors, who find it easier or not so easy to refer to the new hier-
archy of possible justifications. However, it is not evident, how these two as-
pects fit together. Is it a change in power relations between actors that enables 
financial actors to forward “their” reasons more efficiently than before? Or is it 
the general acceptance of the new reasons that gives more influence to those 
actors that are able to refer to them more efficiently than others? 
Theories of Financial Capitalism or Financial Market Capitalism (Windolf 
2005, Windolf 2005, Windolf 2008; Deutschmann 2005; Beyer 2006; Busch 
2008) use to refer to the power of institutional investors, sometimes addressed 
as “the new owners” (Höpner 2003). Ownership, financial dependency, and the 
ability of “new owners” to combine strategies of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ are taken as 
the decisive power resources in this view. These aspects are certainly impor-
tant. However they all operate with a rather vague concept of “pressure”, af-
fected by financial actors on non-financial companies etc. The mechanisms that 
make latent power effective in relation to other actors are not demonstrated 
very well. Concepts of financial dependency, the market for corporate control, 
the application of financial market indicators, shareholder activism etc. are 
conceptually well developed but at best loosely connected to empirical find-
ings. 
Publicly listed companies do only marginally depend on financing by 
shares, if at all. And where replacing dept for equity really increases depend-
ency on financial (bond) markets, this is not the precondition but the outcome 
of financialised strategies. Targets of hostile takeovers are typically not poorly 
managed, underperforming companies or undervalued conglomerates, as theo-
ries on the disciplinary impact of markets of corporate control would suggest, 
but companies that are successful and well in line with management main-
stream. Manifest shareholder activism happens very rarely. And even when we 
take into account that managers might anticipate the possibility of such inter-
ventions, it is their interpretation that becomes strategy and not that of share-
holders. Of course there are road-shows, analyst conferences, ‘one-to-ones’ 
with top managers etc. where representatives of institutional investors take 
influence on management perspectives and by this also on corporate strategies. 
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However, these situations are on evaluating and justifying corporate strategies, 
and not on managers receiving orders given unilaterally by investors or their 
representatives (Faust, Fisecker, and Bahnmüller 2007; Faust and Bahnmüller 
2007; Faust forthcoming; Bébéar and Manière 2003). Finally, there is substan-
tial empirical evidence that when financialisation since the 1990s did increase 
total shareholder returns this was not because of companies’ performance based 
on successfully implementing financialised business strategies, but because of 
an increasing demand for shares without increasing supply (Froud et al. 2000; 
Froud et al. 2006). Moreover, Froud et al. (2006) demonstrate the importance 
of narratives when business figures of specific companies are linked to an 
interpretive framework of financial markets’ requirements. Put in a nutshell, 
there is no empirical evidence for financialisation being nothing but the out-
come of shareholders’ power and strategies. 
The argument presented here is therefore, that financialisation must not be 
perceived as the mere outcome of relations of power rooted elsewhere but first 
and foremost as being based on financial rationality as a power resource on its 
own. Financial rationality is conceived as one type of bounded rationality 
among others, the recent predominance of which has to be analysed as inter-
play of modern financial economics, political regulation, and bargaining of 
social actors. 
1. Economic Rationalities as  
Conventional Judgements of Practice 
As Herbert Simon (Simon 1949, Simon 1976, Simon 1982) demonstrated, 
economic rationality, as rationality in social interaction in general is bounded 
or procedural rationality in any case. These concepts do not just focus on the 
fact that essential limitations of knowledge and information about future events 
are causing fundamental limitations of rationality for corresponding actions: 
uncertainty as developed by Frank A. Knight (Knight 1921). They focus even 
more on the fact that people are able to deal more or less reasonable with these 
essential conditions. As acting rational in social contexts relies mainly on rea-
sonable anticipations on other people’s behaviour and actions, rationality 
means the ability to solve problems of coordination, by finding good reasons to 
ignore the complexity of the world and especially the fact that in principle 
anything could happen. Acting rational or having rational expectations means 
therefore being able to rely on principles and perceptions that can be expected 
to be more or less generally shared by others in a relevant social context. Prin-
ciples and criteria of rationality therefore are conventional, based on suffi-
ciently common understandings, just like language. There are more rationalities 
but one, not only in a historical or an intercultural perspective, but also at the 
same time within the same society, depending on situations. And people’s 
ability to behave rational in a given society is based on their ability to navigate 
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between different rationalities with respect to different situational contexts 
(Dodier 1991). What is rational therefore is not so much a question of philoso-
phy or logic, but to a great deal an empirical question of actors’ reasons for 
practical behaviour. 
As a conceptional framework to deal with this plurality of rationalities, 
French conventional economists (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006; Orléan 1994, Orléan 2005; Salais, Chatel, and Rivaud-Danset 
1998; Storper and Salais 1997; Batifoulier 2001; Thévenot 2001, Thévenot 
2006; Favereau 2008) have developed the concept of orders of justification: 
registers of criteria and principles that allow actors to identify and to specify 
situations and to make clear what may be rational with respect to a given situa-
tion or a situated problem. So individual means-ends-rationality, personal trust, 
loyalty, reference to a collective or general common good, technical efficiency, 
reputation, or the ingenuity and inspiration of enlightened actors stand for 
different orders of justification, that coexist not only in present days’ societies 
but also in economic organisations.  
It is important to see, that rationality and legitimacy are essentially con-
nected in this concept of justification. To justify one’s current actions and 
expectations means basically finding reasons how to act. This may happen 
completely informal by routinely orientation in a narrow localised social con-
text. It may happen by implementing organisational rules and procedures. And 
it may happen by explicitly confronting different general principles of action. 
Laurent Thévenot (2006) recently developed a theoretical framework on these 
different levels and modes of conventional justification and on their interrela-
tions among each other. In any case, as John Dewey (1915) forcefully demon-
strated, judgement in practice is always on means and ends or on facts and 
values at the same time. It is not only that means are chosen with respect to 
ends and values. Means that are perceived in a given situation are on their part 
framing the perspective on what ends can be chosen, and what values may be 
relevant and with which priority in that situation. So justifying action in a given 
situation as rational or as legitimised has to be perceived as the two faces of the 
same coin.  
It is clear, that conventional orders of justification are no definitive solution 
for the problem of uncertainty. Conventional orders of justification do not 
transform real uncertainty into really calculable risk or make bounded rational-
ity substantial. The identification and specification of situations is conventional 
itself, and conventional orders of justification have to be taken as social heuris-
tics. The problem of double contingency and resulting uncertainty is not defi-
nitely solved but managed in a context of pragmatic social interaction. The 
validity of conventional rationalities therefore can be compared – as André 
Orléan (1999, 2005) did with respect to financial market conventions – with 
that of scientific paradigms in Kuhns’ concept: rather stable constructions of 
reality, open and flexible enough to structure the perception of new develop-
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ments and events, and therefore not brought down by contradicting events, but 
if at all then by an accumulation of such events connected to another or new 
paradigm. 
As a result of the plurality of economic rationalities, structuration of situa-
tions by referring to conventional orders of justification is not unambiguous 
and once forever. In most situations there are points of reference for more than 
one order of justification to be brought into play. So in an automotive company 
p.e. the question will not, or at least should not be whether criteria of technical 
efficiency or of cost calculation or of the inspiration of designers etc. may 
justify rational economic action, but to what extent and with what priority each 
of them come into play. And beside situations where all relevant participants 
agree on one order of justification as relevant or on a clear and well defined 
hierarchy between more than one, there are many other situations of more or 
less provisional compromise between competing interpretations of situations 
and their defenders, or even such situations, where the priority of a specific 
interpretation is enforced by power stemming from resources elsewhere. 
However, bringing into play orders of justification is not just an alternative 
to power, but also an important source of power itself. Being able to justify 
ones arguments referring to generally accepted criteria of rationality, or to put 
through an interpretation of a situation, where one’s arguments outweigh those 
of others gives power to an actor in that situation. So by founding an order of 
relevance between reasons and aspects to be brought efficiently into play in 
situations, orders of justification also define hierarchies of influence or power 
between actors. So the power of the better argument is not a matter of intellec-
tual excellence in the first place, it is socially constructed. 
David Stark has defined entrepreneurship as “exploitation of ambiguity”, 
that is “the ability to keep multiple orders of worth in play and to exploit the 
resulting overlap” (Stark 2000, 5)2, an ability that is according to Stark not 
attributed to persons but to organisations. We would extend this interpretation 
by analogy and say that the quality of social integration and the economic 
potential of a society depend on this ability, attributed to the society in this 
case. On the other hand, this ambiguity, this coexistence of different orders of 
justification also is a crucial at least potential source of change (Stark 2009), 
especially in such constellations, where competing rationalities are only provi-
sionally balanced in fragile compromise or even by force. This holds even 
more when external change brings established criteria and orders of rationality 
and legitimacy under pressure, giving actors the opportunity to question effec-
tively the existing order. Where this induces a reconfiguration of economic 
rationalities, this reconfiguration means political and social reconstruction of 
reality in a very practical sense, where relations of power and interest are se-
                                                             
2  “Orders of worth” is equivalent to “orders of justification” in the terminology of this paper. 
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verely involved, and where changes in social relations of power and interest 
use to be an important outcome. The financialisation of capitalist economies 
since the 1980s in my view must be perceived as process of this kind. 
Now focussing on financial rationality as a power resource of its own in-
stead as a mere outcome of power relations based on resources elsewhere does 
not mean that financialisation is nothing but a new mode of intellectual or 
cognitive framing. The institutionalisation of ownership, the public re-
regulation and the globalisation of financial markets, etc. are parts of the story 
that must not be ignored. To bring things together Jens Beckert (2009) recently 
developed a concept of social fields as interrelations of institutions (in the 
narrow meaning of rules), social networks and cognitive framings, influencing, 
stabilising, or destabilising each other.  
The point to be made here is that changes in the area of cognitive framing 
were crucial. Without recalibration of concepts and criteria of economic ratio-
nality bringing financial rationality from the margins to the core of economics, 
financialisation would not have happened as it did. Donald MacKenzie (2005, 
2006), Axel Preda (2005) and others have demonstrated, how new develop-
ments in financial economics established calculability, where just betting, 
guessing, gambling used to prevail. They created legitimacy and public legiti-
misation for products and activities that were perceived as illegitimate gam-
bling before and even forbidden. And they made financial economics the core 
discipline of economics in general, not just because of its intellectual elegance, 
but much more because of its enormous practical impacts, by not just framing 
the perception of economic reality but economical reality itself. MacKenzie has 
analysed this under his concept of performativity. Most of the new institutional 
regulations would not exist without the cognitive and ethical foundations pro-
vided by financial economics. The prudent expert would not have become the 
point of reference in US pension funds legislation (Lavigne 2002, 128-131; 
Montagne 2002; Ravikoff and Curzan 1980), if his expertise still consisted of 
lead-pipe cinches or fail-safe systems as they always have existed around casi-
nos, lotteries, or betting shops. And most of financial intermediaries, knowl-
edge-brokers etc. wouldn’t exist without the huge and continually increasing 
bulk of new financial products based on financial economics used as a manu-
facturing technology. 
In a nutshell: Financialisation should be perceived as a reconfiguration of 
capitalist economies mainly enabled by economics and the establishment of a 
new concept of financial rationality, or as Michel Callon (1998) puts it, as a 
new “embedding of economy in economics”3. That includes the fact that this 
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new rationality provided also new resources of power for actors that had al-
ready been there. Included is also that economics should be perceived as a 
social field itself, where institutions, networks and the consolidation of cogni-
tive categories interact. In this perspective Geoff Lightfoot (Lightfoot forth-
coming) demonstrates the impact of top journals, and editor-contributor net-
works on what finally have become scientific standards in financial economics 
(see also: Veldman 2009). 
But how does financial rationality work when being applied to economic re-
ality? Until now we have discussed financial rationality as one category of 
economic rationality among others. And we have identified the problem of 
rational economic action in finding a satisfying (Simon) way of managing the 
plurality of economic rationalities. However there is a sort of simplification in 
this argument, because there is no application of any economic rationality 
without interpretation. Or to put it in another way: The reality of conventional 
economic rationalities relies on economic actors interpreting similar situations 
in more or less the same manner. So even when actors agree on identifying a 
problem for example as a problem of technical efficiency, this is in most cases 
not the end but the beginning of debate. 
With financial rationality things are even more complicated, because by 
looking at the conditions of its application we find two significantly different 
perspectives on reality, which are only loosely coupled at best: one on financial 
markets as markets, and one on non-financial companies and their strategies 
from a financial markets’ perspective. We will first discuss rather briefly the 
implications of the first and in the following section more extensively those of 
the second perspective. 
2. Financialisation – a Perspective on Financial Markets 
The perspective on financial markets is the original one. The focus of financial 
economics’ modelling was explicitly not on single companies’ business strate-
gies but on enabling financial investors to make investments in the financial 
markets without having to look for what companies really do (MacKenzie 
2006). Calculable risk did exactly not rely on understanding or even looking on 
business strategies but on interpreting statistics. Providing models for calcula-
ble risk had as its indispensable prerequisite the diversity of companies as its 
independent variable; without variety no calculation on probabilities. Homog-
enisation of business strategies based on financial models may even cause 
problems for the validity of these models, at least in the area of financial busi-
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ness, when we follow MacKenzies’ analysis on the LTCM-crash in 1998 
(MacKenzie 2005). 
To put it more generally: The focus of financial mathematics’ modelling is 
on making strategies of financial investment and their risk independent from 
success and failures of any concrete business strategies in the financial and 
non-financial economy. In this line Karin Knorr-Cetina (2005; Knorr-Cetina 
and Bruegger 2002, 2002) has conceptualised financial markets as a virtual 
global sphere of its own where financial markets are on the display of financial 
specialists’ computers – and nowhere else. We think this is correct, although 
there may be some gradations between currency markets and other financial 
markets segments. However, this decoupling of financial markets from the rest 
of economic reality does in fine not create real independency but (at least also) 
blind spots. Some of them are quite simple: 
- Figures in financial business reports are not really reliable when companies 
are allowed to put risky businesses in non-consolidated special purpose enti-
ties, as demonstrated to the great public already by the Enron crash in 2002 
(Windolf 2003; Coffee 2002; Froud et al. 2004). 
- It is (or should be) evident that the validity of historical data on loan defaults 
for actual calculations is at least somehow affected by new practices of (not) 
dealing with risk by securitisation, when bankers pass away credit risks and 
no longer engage in actively avoiding credit failures. 
- Moreover, the rules of the game may change fundamentally when risk cal-
culations based on historical data become the basis of strategic action, and 
randomness may be replaced by mimesis or imitation, as demonstrated early 
by Keynes (Keynes 1936, 153-158; see also: MacKenzie 2005; Orléan 
1999) 
- There had been notorious instabilities in financial markets since the 1980s 
with severe crisis being averted several times just by singular ad hoc inter-
vention (Orléan 1999; MacKenzie 2006, 1-6). 
These and other sources of frictions and instability that were quite obvious 
where finance and financial activities were perceived as real world social ac-
tivities had simply no place in the hermetical and self-referential world of 
mathematic models and computer displays of financial economics. Or to put it 
differently: There was a lot of specialised financial expertise necessary not to 
see or to interpret away those phenomena that would have made at least bad 
feelings to non-professionals when explained in everyday language. 
Another very fundamental blind spot refers to the limits of calculability 
based on normal distribution. Nicholas Taleb (2004, 2008) developed this in a 
popular manner with the impressive picture of the “black swan”, referring to 
Benoit Mandelbrot’s theory of fractals. 
The crucial impact of financialisation at this point is not the occurence of 
blind spots or black swans. The boundedness of rationality implies blind spots 
by definition. And black swans do not occur because of but in spite of financial 
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rationality. The crucial impact of financialisation in this perspective is, that by 
becoming embedded in economics of the sort economies and societies loose the 
consciousness that it might be necessary to be prepared to the existence of 
blind spots and to the occurrence of black swans. 
3. Financialisation – a Perspective on Companies 
Financialisation of companies is brought about by the invention and introduc-
tion of principles and concepts of Shareholder Value Management or Value 
Based Management. Both terms refer to the same concepts and instruments. 
But while these concepts and instruments are justified explicitly by the interests 
of one separate group of stakeholders in the first case, the reference in the 
second is on companies and there “value” sans phrase. This semantic shift 
from particular interests to general requirements of value creation is important 
with respect to the generalisation of respective concepts and instruments. Not 
(only) shareholders but (above all) fundamental principles of value creation 
require their implementation. Frédéric Lordon (2000) has analysed the opera-
tion of establishing “value creation” as a cognitive standard under the concept 
of “idée simple”: a simple formula offering a broad range of interpretations, 
that is so generally accepted in a social context that referring to it spares actors 
to go more into details when justifying economic action. Earlier formulas of 
this kind were “economic growth” under Fordism or “globalisation” in the 
1980 and early 1990s. 
Financialisation of companies implies a fundamental redefining of what a 
company is. The main points of this redefining are the following: 
- Profit objectives are no longer based on evaluating internal resources but on 
key figures such as CAPM, EVA, ROCE etc justified as financial market 
requirements; the return on risk-free investment plus a premium for the spe-
cific risk of an investment in an individual company define the threshold be-
tween destruction and creation of value by an investment. 
- The company is perceived now as a flexible investment-portfolio instead as 
a continual social entity. 
- Portfolio management becomes the core of strategic management instead of 
focussing on internal growth and organisational learning. 
- Strategic focus is on “core competencies” and against combining different 
businesses in order to balance different types of uncertainty and risk. 
- Former synergies across different business areas are redefined – and tabooed 
– as “cross subsidising”. 
- An increasing part of (increasing) management remuneration becomes 
flexible and linked to periodical financial performance. 
These principles are not easily implemented. And Froud et al. have demon-
strated the shortcomings of profit metrics when practically applied as well as 
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the importance of narratives as cognitive compensation for these lacks of con-
sistency (Froud et al. 2000; Froud et al. 2006). 
These shortcomings reflect a fundamental problem of applying financial 
markets’ requirements on non-financial business. The essential function of 
financial markets is preventing liquidity for investors by enabling financial 
investment into the real economy without the long term fixing of financial 
resources that are linked to the implementation of strategies in the real econ-
omy. This implies that there is no direct application of financial markets re-
quirements on non-financial business strategies. Financial markets require-
ments become relevant only by interpretation with respect to specific product 
strategies, market conditions etc. In a nutshell: To become relevant for non-
financial business strategies, financial rationality has to be interpreted and 
specified in the light of other rationalities. 
In what follows the counterbalancing of the alignment to financial markets 
on the one hand and the conditions of the real economy on the other will be 
analysed with examples taken from the pharmaceutical industry. Firstly the 
shift between former and actual justification of economic action is particularly 
essential in the pharmaceutical industry, where the interplay of different ration-
alities used to be rather complex in the past and has become much more univo-
cal by financialisation. Secondly pharma is an especially telling example for 
the dilemmas in dealing with real uncertainty in Knight’s sense. Accordingly 
the innovative pharmaceutical business was traditionally embedded in dealings 
with assessable risk like generics, or – as in Germany, France, and Switzerland 
– combined with chemical business. 
4. Eflornithin – on Changing Economic Perspectives  
on Drug Development 
Although marketing is the most important function of pharmaceutical business 
in terms of investment shares, being able to develop marketable new drugs is 
the core competence of pharmaceutical companies, based on external or inter-
nal early research. The criteria for deciding on research and on subsequent 
development projects have been more or less the same in all pharmaceutical 
companies for a long time: the expected volume of the market, i.e. the number 
of people affected by the disease to be addressed by a new drug; the financial 
background of those people, i.e. the level of their incomes and the coverage of 
respective public health systems; the expected costs of the project, and finally 
the expected likelihood of success or failure. Growing importance of “lifestyle 
drugs” stands for optimisation with respect to market criteria, that of “me-too-
drugs” for the increasing importance of costs and (calculable) risk.  
The case of Eflornithin may demonstrate how conventional practices in 
dealing with these criteria changed with financialisation. Discovering and de-
veloping Eflornithin as a drug against sleeping sickness was the most important 
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breakthrough in fighting severe mass diseases in third world countries in the 
20th century. The new drug is much more effective and causes much less harm-
ful side effects than its very old and highly toxic predecessors. Its efficacy 
against the tropic illness was discovered by the laboratories of US-based 
Merrell plc, where researchers originally tried – unsuccessfully – to develop a 
drug against breast cancer. Being able to continue development in this new 
direction was possible because pharmaceutical companies operated more as 
generalists and not focussed on a narrow portfolio of indication as core compe-
tences. And deciding to continue development with the new focus meant 
spending resources on a drug for poor people without money and without pub-
lic health coverage in by far the most cases. 
Against the background of the aforementioned criteria it is quite clear that 
Merrell as any other drug company would not have invested in research and 
development of a drug for third world people without money. However, when 
the efficacy and the effectiveness of the drug were detected in a late stadium of 
development when most of the money for the project already had been spent, 
aspects of scientific commitment, proven technical feasibility, and public re-
sponsibility obviously out-ruled the dimension of financial returns. For our 
argument it is important to take this not as a story of ethical versus economic 
perspectives but of an economic decision on economic alternatives. In this 
situation financial rationality alone obviously did not provide sufficiently ‘good 
reasons’ to stop the project, when other rationalities framing the companies’ 
collective knowledge base pointed to the opposite direction.  
At the end of the 1980s the situation had changed significantly at this point. 
After several mergers Merrell had become part of Marion Merrell Dow in 
1989. Sites, laboratories, and products were evaluated in order to leverage 
synergies, with synergies being understood as cost reduction by consolidating 
capacities and product portfolios. It was decided to withdraw the non-profit 
drug from the market, the decision becoming effective in 1995, when the com-
pany had become part of Hoechst Marion Roussel (HMR), the pharmaceutical 
company of German Hoechst Group. Withdrawing the drug was completely in 
line with the restructuring strategy of Hoechst’s top management implementing 
more or less a textbook version of Corporate Value Management. Giving prop-
erty rights on the drug to the World Health Organisation (WHO) and agreeing 
to finish about 10.000 units of remainders did not really help because synthe-
sising Eflornithin is complicated and expensive. The WHO could not find a 
new producer, and the capacities of sleeping illness treatment degraded se-
verely from the end of the 1990s on. 
When Eflornithin saw a resurrection after 2000, it was not as a drug for poor 
people suffering from sleeping illness, but for solvent women suffering from 
facial hair. US Company Bristol Myer Squibb had discovered the drug’s effi-
cacy in this highly profitable indication by accident and built up production 
capacities. The WHO’s efforts to make the company produce Eflornithin also 
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for medical use, what would have required some special production steps, 
where not really successful, despite public debate. Finally however, Aventis 
SA (and SanofiAventis SA after a hostile takeover) showed impressed by the 
public debate and agreed to produce Eflornithin for the WHO for initially five 
years and to support activities to establish independent production capacities 
for the WHO. Again, in our view policies of BMS and Aventis should not be 
analysed as economic (only) against ethics (also), but as alternative economic 
decisions, referring on different conceptions or conventional framings of eco-
nomic rationalities. 
5. Blockbuster Drugs and Mergers –  
Two Sides of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Alignment  
to the Financial Markets 
The realignment of the pharmaceutical industry since the 1990s is exemplary 
for the interplay of impulses coming from the real economy and the orientation 
towards the financial markets. This realignment would not be conceivable 
without the success stories of drugs like Prozac and Zantac. The first men-
tioned was an anti-depressant by the US-company Eli Lilly, which was suc-
cessfully marketed as an everyday product for lifting the spirits and as such 
could reap much higher profits than originally expected. In the latter case the 
British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, by means of clever market-
ing, managed to present the modification (only just patentable) of a truly inno-
vative forerunner product4 as a fundamental innovation in itself, thereby 
achieving the highest annual turnover and the highest annual rate of return ever 
met by one product in the industry (Froud et al. 2006, 149-223; Wright 1996). 
Both cases clarified how one could reach hitherto unknown levels of profit by 
means of strategic marketing. In fact they became prototypes of a business 
model concentrating purely on patent protected, highly profitable key products 
with an annual turnover of at least a billion dollars – and on the markets and the 
indications where such turnovers and margins could be generated. Since the 
1990s the share of turnover of a few top-products became a key figure for the 
assessment of pharmaceutical enterprises by stock market analysts. Accord-
ingly the major German and other European pharmaceutical companies too 
shed their generics branches, and partly with high losses – despite the fact that 
shortly before in some cases such as Hoechst and Bayer the very same 
branches had been enlarged by strategic acquisitions with an eye towards the 
eastern European markets (Kädtler 2006, 81-83). 
                                                             
4  The real innovation was the drug Tagamet, put on the market by Smith, Kline & French in 
the late 1970s. This medicament made it possible to reduce the development of stomach 
ulcer (and its subsequent surgical treatment) by 80 percent. 
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The focussing on products reaping turnovers of that calibre resulted in a 
fundamental internal dilemma of competing economic rationalities. In a real 
economic perspective based on scientific and technical rationalities, engaging 
in uncertainty by focussing on extremely unlikely events like developing a 
blockbuster inevitably implies discontinuity. In this perspective high earnings 
are justified by the necessity to be prepared for the inevitable downturns, when 
drugs run out of patents. According to this logic high profits enable business 
continuity based on a sufficient amount of retained earnings. Financial rational-
ity in a Corporate Value Management perspective builds on the argument that 
high risk should be balanced by high profits, however requiring at the same 
time continuity for peak level profits, high payout ratios, and dediversification 
by focussing on blockbusters. This alternative justification of high pharma 
profits is based on neglecting the difference between individual investments in 
(liquid) pharma stocks on the one hand and organisational irreversible invest-
ment in (not only) pharma innovation on the other (Lazonick 2001, Lazonick 
2004). The result of this short-circuit is a fundamentally instable business 
model. 
The effective resort from this dilemma has been a marked dynamic of merg-
ers and takeovers. Making blockbusters the exclusive base of a company’s 
strategy and making continually high profits is a realistic option only connec-
tion with perfunctory external growth. This is even more the case because the 
narrow focussing on innovative products is not accompanied by a surplus in 
product innovations. To get to the point: These days the continuity of high 
turnovers (in pharmaceuticals) is secured by defensive5 mergers and takeovers 
and not by product innovations – flanked by the longstanding failure of above 
all the US administration, to efficiently limit the prizes of pharmaceuticals. The 
industry’s stylized image as being innovative is primarily based on a linkage of 
individual success stories, intensive marketing and an efficient communication 
with the financial markets. Euphoric expectations raised by short-term suc-
cesses in bio technology and genetic engineering contributed temporarily to 
this image – but by now have been replaced by a clearly more sober mood.6 
6. Pharmaceutical Innovations and Financial Controlling 
To habitually opt for defensive mergers is less of a consciously chosen strat-
egy. It’s rather perceived as the only solution possible under the given circum-
stances because all projects to reorganise pharmaceutical companies have made 
                                                             
5  They are perceived as defensive, because from the company’s perspective they primarily 
serve the purpose to compensate for the running out of some of their own major patents by 
taking over the already licensed products of others with their longer durations of patents. 
6  As for the connection between innovation and financial markets in the ‘red’ biotechnology 
sector cf. Briken and Kurz 2004, 2006. 
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the increase in research output their top priority. Especially the tighter supervi-
sion of research work – strictly aligned to financial figures and narrowly con-
ceived, unambiguously addressed indications – is constantly justified with the 
intention to avoid any possible deadlock, to shorten development times and by 
doing so to concentrate one’s financial resources on promising projects. The 
result, however, is negative. The total number of newly permitted drugs is in 
decline. A tendency that is even more pronounced, if one leaves aside the so 
called ‘me-too-medicaments’, whose structure and effects hardly differ from 
already existing drugs (Rydzewski 2008, 16-18). 
There is hardly a definitive answer to the question whether this is the case 
because of stricter controlling or rather despite of it. What speaks for the latter 
assumption is the fact that German Bayer Group’s last real blockbuster, the 
anti-infective Ciprofloxacin, was developed under conditions (o.A. 2000) that 
do not any longer exist, due to the restructurings of the 1990s carried out with 
explicit reference to shareholder and company value. The drug was not devel-
oped in pharmaceutical research but rather in the former (horizontal) central 
research section, whose dissolution ran parallel with the dissolution of the old 
industrial structure. Focussing on ‘core competences’ and tabooing industrial 
synergies as cross subsidising implied that there was no room any more for a 
research structure focussing on scientific and technological synergies among 
different business areas. And the new drug only came about because two de-
velopers secretly carried on with the officially cancelled project – a kind of 
behaviour no longer possible under the new regulations. An individual case, 
admittedly, but from which one probably can draw some more general conclu-
sions on changing orders of justifying economic action (not only) in the re-
search area. 
It is important to take serious the fact that continuing on the project for six 
months and by this neglecting a formal management decision was possible and 
practically accepted in the company at that time. The researchers violated for-
mal rules, but they did it within limits of a conventionally accepted manner. 
They did not simply ignore or deny the relevance of formal organisational rules 
in principle. Rather they justified their behaviour by exploiting the gap between 
formal and conventional organisational rules, referring to the two complemen-
tary tiers of orders of engagement introduced by Thévenot (2006): the orders of 
explicit justification, where professional standards as scientists came into play; 
and the areas of informal rules and hierarchies in familiar here-and-there rela-
tions. Conditions for justifying economic action in the field have fundamentally 
changed since then by introducing clearly defined financial and temporal tar-
gets that are being made obligatory by narrow monitoring procedures based on 
detailed guidelines and metrics. As a result, the room for actors to find their 
own view on applying organisational rules has significantly diminished. 
We do not want to overstress the individual case. However, fact of the mat-
ter is that the company’s last important pharmaceutical innovation wouldn’t 
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have materialised under present conditions and that comparable results (under 
these new conditions) are yet to come.7 The example given and the fact that 
pharmaceutical innovations frequently turn out to be effective in different ways 
than originally calculated, may be seen as a hint that innovations and a nar-
rowly conceived control aligned to indices do not harmonise very well. It is 
therefore doubtful whether the problem of innovation can be solved through a 
newly accentuated separation of labour between industrial and academic re-
search. Recent research in the field of bio sciences raises further doubts (Kurz 
and Wolf 2009).8 
7. Alignment to Financial Markets  
as a Marginalisation of Operational Work 
The preference for immaterial rather than material resources can be seen as one 
main feature of company strategies aligned to the financial markets. Intellectual 
property and the competences necessary for it are considered to be of central 
importance, whereas investments in material production and other functions are 
seen as restrictions which have to be minimised as far as possible. There is no 
room for tapping and developing innovation competence in the sector of mate-
rial production – unless it can be presented as the adoption of standards set by a 
leader in the field (keyword: Toyotism). The prevailing logic could be summed 
up as follows: Investment goes into the development of intellectual property, 
whereas in the service and production sectors one tries to save money. How-
ever, the latter tendency can only indirectly be ascribed to the demands voiced 
or the targets set by investors and authorities from outside the companies. Be-
cause HR-policy and the corresponding strategies below the higher manage-
ment level play no independent role – as Faust et al. (2007) demonstrated – for 
the evaluation of enterprises by analysts and fund managers. From this perspec-
tive the personnel does not appear as a resource, but as an expense factor. La-
bour costs can be quantified precisely, whereas the amount of value attributable 
to the staff becomes an indistinguishable part of the overall result. Within the 
companies the alignment towards the financial markets materialises as a con-
tinual, close-meshed planning with detailed targets in form of detailed indices 
                                                             
7  A comparison of turnovers in the pharmaceutical industry between 2001 and 2007 shows 
that he profits from Bayer’s own medicaments have declined. Thus, internal innovations 
were not even sufficient to compensate for the expiring Ciprofloxacin patent. That the com-
pany is doing well nevertheless is due to Bayer’s takeover of the Schering AG which 
brought two blockbusters into the alliance. They are now Bayer Pharma’s top sellers and its 
main source of profit. 
8  Apart from that there is a fundamental impairment of innovations caused by the controlling 
according to criteria of the financial markets and the focussing of research on sections with 
blockbuster potential. For drugs against diseases of small populations or big populations 
with no money there is no place here. 
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(Nicolai and Thomas 2004). Therefore operating managers, who have to pre-
sent their indices every three months, prefer to concentrate on simple and im-
mediate cost cutting measures rather than to get involved with the uncertain 
long-term business of innovations at the work place. This is clearly indicated 
by the definition of wholesale cost cutting targets subsequently applied to the 
different sectors. It is in this spirit that the orientation towards Toyotism takes 
place, i.e. as a selective, key figure oriented benchmarking – and not by adopt-
ing the complex organisational makeup of the original enterprise (Kuhlmann, 
Sperling, and Balzert 2004, 323-333). As a result we find standardisation and 
dequalification becoming major trends in organising operational work. Taylor-
ism, which during the crisis of Fordism temporarily got into trouble, is return-
ing to the production sector as a means of cost management – and by doing so 
changes its face. Originally the embodiment of an increase in material produc-
tivity by means of industrial engineering, it now functions as a basis for cost 
management by means of financial engineering. Another variety of this orienta-
tion is the demerger of the service and infrastructural sectors, which are still 
necessary for the enterprise but no longer part of the core business. However, 
different company strategies in this respect and the revocation of already com-
pleted outsourcings prove that the management of the real economy through 
financial controlling has its limits – limits which might serve as a trigger to 
reinterpret existing economic necessities. 
8. Conclusions 
In 2008 the most important financial and economic crisis since the 1930s has 
erupted. Or to put it in Taleb’s terms: The Black Swan has come and found a 
financialised world completely unprepared, not despite but because of its com-
prehensive impregnation with financial rationality. Whereas former financial 
crisis used to happen in societies where the vast majority of economic activities 
was only indirectly linked to the financial sphere and its (ir)rationalities, if at 
all, financial rationality now has become established as generic economic ra-
tionality sans phrase. And when in the 1920s and 1930s and in the age of Ford-
ism “Scientific Management” was on optimising economic efficiency by indus-
trial engineering, sciences of management are nowadays based on financial 
economics. There is still a plurality of conventional economic rationalities, 
however dominated by financial rationality. 
Financial economics and financial rationality have become established as a 
dominant language-game9 for the scientific community of economists and for 
                                                             
9  We refer to Wittgenstein’s (2009) concept of language game and to its application by 
Olivier Favereau in his discussion of the (realised) pragmatic and the (hypothetic) radical 
version of Keynes’ General Theory (Favereau 2005). 
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important practical economic actors. This makes an important difference be-
tween the situation of the 1920s and 1930s, when dominant “orthodox” eco-
nomics could not even conceptualise crucial problems of practical economic 
actors, and by this de facto gave room to heretic economists focussing on these 
problems (Favereau 2005). Practical economic actors in the financial and in the 
real economy today are main supporters of financial rationality, the first using 
it as production technology, the latter by justifying management strategies. 
Interpreting financial rationality for practical use in a financialised world gives 
enormous power to these actors. 
This empowerment remains relative for financial actors as well as for corpo-
rate strategic management, exactly because bringing together different ration-
alities is not just an intellectual operation but mainly the outcome of practical 
negotiating and bargaining. Their autonomy to define situations based on their 
respective interpretations of financial rationality and financial markets’ re-
quirements finds its limitations in the power resources of actors bringing other 
perspectives on rationality and legitimacy into play, and in the preparedness of 
those actors to make their power resources effective. For strategic management 
this is financial actors and the general public of financial markets in the first 
place. Top managers cannot simply ignore financialised codes and cognitive 
framings, but have to “explain” strategy and actions in compatible terms. How-
ever, financial actors have no original competence to evaluate non financial 
business, but depend on models and interpretations delivered by management. 
So there is much room for creative interpretation by convincingly presented 
narratives (Froud et al. 2006; Froud et al. 2009)10. And there are other relevant 
actors and competing rationalities within companies. Where a company’s busi-
ness depends on product strategies that essentially rely on collective capabili-
ties of a qualified and socially well integrated workforce, management cannot 
really ignore those workers’ perspectives on justified economic action. So what 
becomes effective as financial rationality is a result of bargaining on economic 
rationalities and legitimacy, however with financial rationality and its support-
ers in a dominant position. So when disparities of income strongly increase in 
financialised societies, this is not because of a shift from wages to capital in-
comes, as reference to shareholders’ interests might suggest, but because of 
exploding incomes of top wage earners such as top managers and top financial 
agents in the first place (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010). 
                                                             
10  As the most impressive example for the power of creative interpretation and narrative we 
would see the case of General Electric in the era of CEO Jack Welch. GE and Jack Welch 
for many years were perceived (and valued) as paradigmatic for Shareholder-Value-
Management despite the fact, that GE was an industrial conglomerate par excellence (Froud 
et al. 2006, 299-368). Moreover, Beunza and Garud (2007) demonstrated the influence of 
securities analysts as “frame-makers” in selecting among competing narratives or business 
stories. 
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By becoming a dominant language-game, financial economics and financial 
rationality have cut the umbilical cord to financial markets in a narrow sense. 
Accordingly the financial and economic crisis since 2007 is perceived by the 
dominant economic and political discourse as a crisis in the financial market-
place only, certainly a dramatic one that nonetheless will not compromise ‘the’ 
financial market in its position as a theoretical point of reference and justifica-
tion. In this perspective, the focus is on individual greed and moral deficiency 
of important actors, particular organisational and technical inefficiencies in 
evaluating and regulating financial market activities and the like as the very 
causes of the crisis. Just as particular deviations do not really question Kuhn’s 
scientific paradigms but at most initiate some refinement, those factors will 
initiate some fine-tuning of econometric models and financial regulation but 
not question the dominance of financial rationality and financialised capitalism 
as economic rationality per se. 
Contrary to this dominant perception we hold a view of the actual crisis as 
being the outcome of fundamental systemic instabilities of financialised capi-
talism, caused by grading up financial rationality from being one economic 
rationality among others to becoming generic rationality sans phrase. For one 
most important outcome of conventional as well as institutional analysis 
(Nelson 1997; Nelson and Winter 1982) is that there is no optimisation of 
economic strategies and organisations. In this line Salais and Storper (1997) 
have demonstrated, how companies refer to different conventional rationalities 
in order to address different types of markets and of internal resources and the 
respective types of uncertainty and risk. And Nelson has argued that organisa-
tions always combine specific capacities and specific limits of organisational 
learning. Covering a broad variety of organisational configurations in this 
perspective is an important asset for an economy and its stability and develop-
ment perspectives. Put in a nutshell: The adequacy of organisational forms or 
specific rationalities depends on situations. And the capacity of individual 
actors, organisations, and societies to deal with uncertainty in always contin-
gent situations depends on the capacity to draw on a variety of rationalities and 
organisational forms in order to find situated or “satisficing” (Simon) solutions. 
Reducing the plurality of socially constructed conventional rationalities by 
establishing financial rationality based on financial economics as the general 
standard for economic rationality therefore does not enhance but severely de-
crease the capacity for rational economic action in the only realistic under-
standing: as achieving bounded rationality under the conditions of real uncer-
tainty. 
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